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Abstract
We study the Byzantine lattice agreement (BLA) problem in asynchronous distributed message
passing systems. In the BLA problem, each process proposes a value from a join semi-lattice and
needs to output a value also in the lattice such that all output values of correct processes lie on a
chain despite the presence of Byzantine processes. We present an algorithm for this problem with
round complexity of O(log f) which tolerates f < n5 Byzantine failures in the asynchronous setting
without digital signatures, where n is the number of processes. We also show how this algorithm
can be modified to work in the authenticated setting (i.e., with digital signatures) to tolerate f < n3
Byzantine failures.
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1 Introduction
In distributed systems, reaching agreement in the presence of process failures is a fundamental
task. Understanding the kind of agreement that can be reached helps us understand the
limitation of distributed systems with failures. Consensus [15] is the most fundamental
problem in distributed computing. In this problem, each process proposes some input value
and has to decide on some output value such that all correct processes decide on the same
valid output. In synchronous message systems with crash failures, consensus cannot be
solved in fewer than f + 1 rounds [8]. In asynchronous systems, consensus is impossible
in the presence of even one crash failure [10]. The k-set agreement [4] is a generalization
of consensus, in which processes can decide on at most k values instead of just one single
value. The k-set agreement cannot be solved in asynchronous systems if the number of crash
failures f ≥ k [2, 11]. The paper [5] shows that k-set agreement problem cannot be solved
within b fk c rounds if n ≥ f + k + 1 in crash failure model.
The lattice agreement problem was proposed by Attiya et al [1] to solve the atomic
snapshot object problem in shared memory systems. In this problem, each process i ∈ [n]
has input xi and needs to output yi such that the following properties are satisfied.
1) Downward-Vaility: xi ≤ yi for each correct process i.
2) Upward-Validity: yi ≤ unionsq{xi | i ∈ [n]}.
3) Comparability: for any two correct processes i and j, either yi ≤ yj or yj ≤ yi.
The lattice agreement problem is a weaker problem than the consensus problem and the
k-set agreement problem. It can be solved in O(log f) rounds in synchronous systems and
tolerate f < n crash failures [20]. In asynchronous systems, it can also be solved in O(log f)
rounds but can only tolerate f < n2 crash failures [19].
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Attiya et al in [1] presents a generic algorithm to transform any protocol for the lattice
agreement problem to a protocol for implementing an atomic snapshot object in shared
memory systems. This transformation can be easily implemented in message passing systems
by replacing each read and write step with sending “read” and “write” messages to all and
waiting for acknowledgements from n− f different processes. On the other hand, if we can
implement an atomic snapshot object, lattice agreement can also be solved easily both on
shared-memory and message passing systems with only crash failures. Thus, solving the
lattice agreement problem in message passing systems is equivalent to implementing an
atomic snapshot object in message passing systems with only crash failures.
Using lattice agreement protocols, Faleiro et al [9] gives procedures to build a special
class of linearizable and serializable replicated state machines which only support query
operations and update operations but not mixed query-update operations. Later, Xiong et
al [19] proposes some optimizations for their procedure for implementing replicated state
machines from lattice agreement in practice. They propose a method to truncate the logs
maintained in the procedure in [9]. The recent paper [17] by Skrzypczak et al proposes
a protocol based on generalized lattice agreement, which is a multi-shot version of lattice
agreement problem, to provide linearizability for state based conflict-free data types [16] the
procedure given in [9] in terms of memory consumption, at the expense of progress.
In message passing systems with crash failures, the lattice agreement problem is well
studied [1, 19, 20, 13]. The best upper bound for both synchronous systems and asynchronous
systems is O(log f) rounds. In the Byzantine failure model, a variant of the lattice agreement
problem is first studied by Nowak et al [14]. Then, Di Luna et al [7] proposes a validity
condition which still permits the application of lattice agreement protocol in obtaining atomic
snapshots and implementing a special class of replicated state machines. They present an
O(f) rounds algorithm for the Byzantine lattice agreement problem in asynchronous message
systems. For synchronous message systems, a recent preprint [18] gives three algorithms.
The first algorithm takes O(
√
f) rounds and has the early stopping property. The second
and third algorithm takes O(logn) and O(log f) rounds but are not early stopping. All three
algorithms can tolerate f < n3 failures. They also show how to modify their algorithms to
work for authenticated settings and tolerates f < n2 failures. The preprint [6] presents an
algorithm which takes O(log f) rounds which can tolerate f < n4 failures and shows how to
improve resilience to f < n3 by using digital signatures and public-key infrastructure.
In this work, we present new algorithms for the Byzantine lattice agreement (BLA)
problem in asynchronous message passing systems. In this problem, each process i ∈ [n] has
input xi from a join semi-lattice (X,≤,unionsq) with X being the set of elements in the lattice, ≤
being the partial order defined on X, and unionsq being the join operation. Each process i has to
output some yi ∈ X such that the following properties are satisfied. Let C denote the set of
correct processes in the system and t denote the actual number of Byzantine processes in the
system.
Comparability: For all i ∈ C and j ∈ C, either yi ≤ yj or yj ≤ yi.
Downward-Validity: For all i ∈ C, xi ≤ yi.
Upward-Validity: unionsq{yi | i ∈ C} ≤ unionsq({xi | i ∈ C} ∪B), where B ⊂ X and |B| ≤ t.
Our main contribution is summarized as follows.
I Theorem 1. There is an O(log f) rounds algorithm for the BLA problem in asynchronous
systems which can tolerate f < n5 Byzantine failures, where n is the number of processes in
the system. The algorithm takes O(n2 log f) messages.
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I Theorem 2. There is a O(log f) rounds algorithm for the BLA problem in authenticated
asynchronous systems which can tolerate f < n3 Byzantine failures, where n is the number of
processes in the system. The algorithm takes O(n2 log f) messages.
2 System Model
We assume a distributed asynchronous message system with n processes with unique ids
in [1, 2, ..., n]. The communication graph is a clique, i.e., each process can send messages
to any other process in the system. We assume that the communication channel between
any two processes is reliable. There is no upper bound on message delay. We assume that
processes can have Byzantine failures but at most f < n/3 processes can be Byzantine in any
execution of the algorithm. We use parameter t to denote the actual number of Byzantine
processes in a system. By our assumption, we must have t ≤ f . Byzantine processes can
deviate arbitrarily from the algorithm. We say a process is correct or non-faulty if it is not
a Byzantine process. We consider both systems with and without digital signatures. In a
system with digital signatures, Byzantine processes cannot forge the signature of correct
processes.
3 O(log f) Rounds Algorithm for the Asynchronous BLA Problem
In this section, we present an algorithm for the BLA problem in asynchronous systems
which takes O(log f) rounds of asynchronous communication and tolerates f < n5 Byzantine
failures. The high level idea of the algorithm is to apply a Byzantine tolerant classifier
procedure, similar to the classifier procedure in [20] for crash failure systems, to divide a
group of processes into the slave subgroup and the master subgroup such that the values of
the slave group is less than the values of the master group. Then, by recursively applying
such a classifier procedure within each subgroup, eventually all processes have comparable
values. The classifier procedure for crash failure model only needs to guarantee that the value
a correct slave process is at most the value of any correct master process and the size of the
union of all values of correct slave processes is at most k. The parameter k is a knowledge
threshold.
Fig. 1 shows the classification tree which specifies the threshold parameter for each group
when the classifier procedure is invoked recursively. Before recursively invoking the classifier
procedure, an initial round is used to let all processes exchange their input values. After this
initial round, each process obtains at least n− f values. Each node in the tree represents
a group. We also use label to indicate the threshold parameter of a group. Initially, all
processes are in the same group with label n− f2 . Let G be a group with label k at level r.
The master group (the right child node) of G has label k + f2r+1 . The slave group (the left
child node) of G has label k − f2r+1 . We can observe that all labels in the classification tree
up to level log f are unique. The above properties of the classifier procedure guarantee that
processes in a leaf group must have the same value.
In presence of Byzantine processes, the above properties are not enough for recursively
applying such classifier procedure within each subgroup. A Byzantine process in a slave
group can introduce some new values which are not known by some master process. We
introduce the notion of admissible values for a group (to be defined later), which is the set of
values that processes in this group can ever have. We present a Byzantine tolerant classifier
procedure with threshold parameter k which provides the following three properties: 1) Each
correct slave process has at most k values and each correct master process has more than k
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n− f2
n− 3f4 n− f4
n− f n− f + 1 nn− 1
level 1 :
level 2 :
level log f + 1 :
... . . .
Figure 1 The Classification Tree
values. 2) The admissible values of the slave group is a subset of the value of any correct
master process. 3) The union of all admissible values in the slave group has size less than
the threshold parameter k.
Suppose now we have a classifier which guarantees the above properties. The main
algorithm, shown in Fig. 2, proceeds in asynchronous rounds. Each process i has a label li,
which is used as the threshold parameter when it invokes the classifier procedure. Initially,
each process has the same label k0 = n− f2 . The label of a process is updated at each round
according to the classification tree. In some places of our algorithm, we use the reliable
broadcast primitive defined by Bracha [3] to send values. In this primitive, a process uses
RB_broadcast to send a message and uses RB_broadcast to reliably deliver a message.
This primitive guarantees many nice properties. In our algorithm, we need the following
two main properties: 1) If a message is reliably delivered by some correct process, then this
message will eventually be reliably delivered by each correct process. 2) If a correct process
reliably delivers a message from process p, then each correct process reliably delivers the
same message from p.
In the initial round at line 1-2, process i RB_broadcast its input xi to all and waits for
RB_deliver from n− f different processes. Then, it updates its value set to be the set of
values reliably delivered at this round. When reliable delivering a value, process i adds this
value into its safe value set for the initial group k0 = n− f2 . The reliable delivering procedure
is running on background. So this safe value set for the initial group keeps growing. By the
properties of reliable broadcast, this safe value set can only contain at most one value from
each process. This ensures Upward-Validity.
After the initial round, we can assume that all values in the initial safe value set of each
process are unique, which can be done by associating the sender’s id with the value.
From line 3 to line 8, process i executes the classifier procedure (to be presented later)
for log f rounds. At each round, it invokes the classifier procedure to decide whether it is
classified as a slave or master and then updates its value accordingly. At round r, if process
i is a master, it updates its label to be li := li + f2r+1 . Otherwise, if updates its label to be
li := li − f2r+1 .
Applying the above three properties provided by the classifier procedure, by induction on
the round number, we can readily see that at the end of round log f , for any two correct
process i and j, if they are in the same group, say with label k, then both i and j must have
exactly k values and their union also has exactly k values. Then, i and j must have the same
set of values. If they are in different group, then by recursively applying property 2, the
values of one process must be subset of the values of the other process.
We now show a Byzantine tolerant classifier which satisfies the properties we define.
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Code for process i:
xi: input value yi: output value
li: label of process i. Initially, li = k0 = n− f2 :
V ri : value set held by process i at round r of the algorithm
Map Si: Si[k] denote the safe value set for group k
/* Initial Round */
1: RB_broadcast(xi), wait for n− f RB_deliver(xj) from pj
2: Set V 1i as the set of values reliably delivered
/* Round 1 to log f */
3: for r := 1 to log f
4: (V r+1i , class) := Classifier(V ri , li, r)
5: if class = master then li := li + f2r+1
6: else li := li − f2r+1
7: end for
8: yi := unionsq{v ∈ V log f+1i }
Upon RB_deliver(xj) from pj
Si[k0] := Si[k0] ∪ xj
Figure 2 O(log f) Rounds Algorithm for the BLA Problem
3.1 The Byzantine Tolerant Classifier
The Byzantine tolerant classifier procedure, shown in Fig. 7, is inspired by the asynchronous
classifier procedure given in [19] for the crash failure model. We say a process writes a value
to at least n− f processes if it sends a “write” message containing the value to all processes
and waits for n − f different processes to send acknowledgement back. We say a process
reads from at least n− f processes if it sends a “read” message to all processes and waits
for at least n− f processes to send their current values back. We say a process performs a
write-read step if it writes its value to at least n− f processes and reads their values.
In the asynchronous classifier procedure for the crash failure model [19], to divide a
group into a slave subgroup and a master subgroup, each process in the group first writes its
value to at least n− f processes and then reads from at least n− f processes. After that,
each process checks whether the union of all values read has size greater than the threshold
parameter k or not. If true, it is classified as a master process, otherwise, it is classified as a
slave process. Slave processes keep their value the same. To guarantee that the value of each
slave process is less than the value of each master process, each master process performs a
write-read step to write the values obtained at the read step to at least n− f processes and
read the values from them. Then it updates its value to be the union of all values read. The
second read step guarantees that the size of the union of values of slave processes is at most
k, since the last slave process which completes the write step must be able to read all values
of slave processes.
Constructing such a classifier procedure in presence of Byzantine processes is much more
difficult. In order to adapt the above procedure to work in Byzantine failure setting, we need
to address the following challenges. First, in the write step or read step, when a process
waits for at least n− f different processes to send their values back, a Byzantine process can
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send arbitrary values. Second, simply ensuring that the values of a slave process is a subset
of values of each master process is not enough, since a Byzantine process can introduce
some values unknown to a master process in the slave group. For example, even if we can
guarantee that the current value of each slave process is less that the value of each master
process, in a later round, a Byzantine process can send some new value to a slave process
which is unknown to some master process. This is possible in an asynchronous systems since
messages can be arbitrarily delayed. Third, ensuring that the union of all values in the slave
group has size at most k is quite challenging. A simple second read step does not work any
more since the last process which completes the write step might be a Byzantine process.
To prevent the first problem, in the Byzantine classifier procedure, when a process wants
to perform a write step or read step, it applies the reliable broadcast primitive to broadcast
its value. When a process waits for values from at least n− f processes, it only accepts a
value if the value is a subset of the values reliably delivered by this process. By property of
reliable broadcast, this ensures that each accepted value must be reliably broadcast by some
process, which prevents Byzantine processes from introducing arbitrary values.
To tackle the second and third problem, the key idea is to restrict the values that a
Byzantine process, which claims itself to be a slave process, can successfully reliable broadcast
in later rounds. To achieve that, first we require that that a slave process can only reliable
broadcast the value that it has reliably broadcast in the previous round. This prevents
Byzantine processes from introducing arbitrary new values into a slave group. Second, we
require each process which claims itself as a slave process to prove that it is indeed classified
as a slave at the previous round when it tries to reliable broadcast a value at the current
round by presenting the set of values it used to do classification. To enforce the above two
requirements, we add a validity condition when a process echoes a message in the reliable
broadcast primitive. However, this is not enough, since the value of a Byzantine slave process
might not be known to a master process if broadcast value of the Byzantine process is
arbitrarily delayed. To ensure that the value a Byzantine process reliably broadcast to be
read by each correct master process, we force a Byzantine process who wants to be able to
reliable broadcast a value in the slave group at next round to actually write its value to at
least bn+f2 c+1− f correct processes, i.e., at least bn+f2 c+1− f correct processes must have
received the value of a Byzantine process before each correct master process tries to read
from at least n− 2f correct processes. These two sets of correct processes must have at least
one correct process in common since f < n5 .
The validity condition we add in the reliable broadcast ensures that the admissible values
for the slave group must be subset of the value set of any correct master process and the
union of these values has size at most the threshold k.
Each process which is classified as master is not required to prove its group identity
but the value it tries to broadcast has to be a subset of safe value sets of correct processes.
Similar to the asynchronous classifier procedure in [19], to ensure that the value of a slave
process is less than the value of a master process, the master process needs to write to and
read from at least n− f processes after it is classified as a master process.
3.1.1 Bounded Reliable Broadcast
Before explaining the Byzantine classifier procedure in detail, we modify the reliable broadcast
primitive by adding a condition when a process echoes a broadcast message. This condition
(to be explained later) restricts the admissible values for each group. For completeness, the
modified reliable broadcast procedure is shown in Fig. 3. When a process reliable broadcast
a value, it also includes the round number, the label of the group it belongs to and a proof of
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BRB_broadcast(type, pf, v, k, r)
type denotes the type of the message to be sent, either “write” or “read”
pf is an array which is a proof of sender’s group identity
v is the value to be sent, k is the label of the sender, r is the round number
The valid function is defined in Fig. 5
Broadcast INIT(i, type, pf, v, k, r) to all
Upon receiving INIT(j, tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj)
if (first reception of INIT(j, tj ,−,−,−, rj)
wait until valid(tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj)
Broadcast ECHO(j, tj , vj , kj , rj) to all
endif
Upon receiving ECHO(j, tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj)
if ECHO(j, tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj) is received from at least bn+f2 c+ 1 different processes
∧ READY(j, vj , kj , rj) has not yet broadcasted
Broadcast READY(j, tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj)
endif
Upon receiving READY(j, tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj)
if READY(j, tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj) received from f + 1 different processes ∧
READY(j, tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj) has not been broadcasted
Broadcast READY(j, tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj)
endif
if READY(j, tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj) received from 2f+1 different processes ∧ (j, tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj)
has not been delivered
BRB_deliver(j, tj , pfj , vj , kj , rj)
endif
Figure 3 Bounded Reliable Broadcast
its group identity. The proof is an array of size n denoting the values read by the sender at
previous round. When a process i receives a broadcast message from process j, it waits for the
validity condition to hold and then echoes the message. We say a process BRB_broadcasts
a message if it executs BRB_broadcast procedure with the massage. We say a process
BRB_delivers a message if it executes BRB_deliver with this message.
3.1.2 Group and Admissible Values
In our algorithm, each process i has a label li, which serves as the threshold when it invokes
the classifier procedure. The notion of group defined as below is based on labels of processes.
I Definition 3 (group). A group is a set of processes which have the same label. The label
of a group is the label of the processes in this group. The label of a group is also the threshold
value processes in this group use to do classification.
We also use label to indicate a group. We say a process is in group k if its message is associated
with label k. Initially all processes are within the same group with label k0 = n− f2 . The
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label of each process is updated at each round based on whether it is classified as a slave or
a master.
We introduce the notion of admissible values for a group, which are the set of values that
processes in the group can ever have.
I Definition 4 (admissible values for a group). The admissible values for a group G with label
k is the set of values that can be reliably delivered with label k if they are reliably broadcast
by some process (possibly Byzantine) with label k.
In our classifier, each process in group k updates its value set to a subset of the values
which are reliably delivered with label k. Thus, the value set of each process in group k must
be a subset of the admissible values for group k. Our algorithm ensures that this property
holds continues to hold until the end of the algorithm.
3.2 The Classifier
The classifier procedure for process i ∈ [n], shown in Fig. 7, has three input parameters: V
is the current value set of process i, k is the threshold value used to do the classification,
which is also the current label of process i, and r is the round number.
In line 1-2, process i writes its current value set to at least n− f processes by using the
BRB_broadcast procedure to send a “write” message. If process i is classified as a slave
at the previous round, it needs to include the array of values it read from at least n − f
processes at previous round as a proof of its group identity. This proof is used by every other
process in the valid function to decide whether to echo the “write” message or not. When
process i BRB_delivers a “write” message with label k at round r, it includes the value in
it into its safe value set for group m(k, r). The safe value set is used to restrict the set of
values that can be delivered in the master group m(k, r). Due to this step, we can see that
the admissible values in the master subgroup must be a subset of the admissible values at
the current group. Process i also includes the value contained in the “write” message into
ACV ri [k], which stores the set of values reliably delivered with label k at round r.
From line 3 to line 4, process i reads values from at least n− f processes by using the
BRB_broadcast procedure to send a “read” message to all. In the valid function, each
process j echos a “read” message from process i only if it has BRB_delivered the “write”
message from process i sent at line 2. This step is used to ensure that for any process,
possibly Byzantine, to read from other processes, it must have written its value to at least
bn+f2 c+ 1− f correct processes, otherwise it cannot have enough processes echo its “read”
message in the BRB_broadcast. When process i BRB_delivers a “read” message with
label k from process j at round r, it records the set of values it has reliably delivered with
label k in RT ri [j]. Then process i sends back a rack message along with the set of reliably
delivered values with label k at round r to process j. At line 3, after the “read” message
is sent, process i has to wait for valid rack message from n− f processes. A rack message
is valid if the value set contained in it is a subset of ACV ri [k], which is the set of values
reliably delivered with label k at round r. Consider a rack(Rj , r) message from a correct
process j. Since j is correct, each value in Rj must have been reliably delivered by process
j. By property of reliable broadcast, each value in Rj will eventually be reliably delivered
by process i, thus Rj ⊆ ACV ri [k]. Thus, eventually process i can obtain n− f valid rack
message. At line 4, process i records the set of valid Rjs obtained at line 3 into array RV ri .
So, this array stores the values reliably delivered with label k that process i read from all
processes. This array is used to do classification in line 5-11 and also used as the proof of
group identity of process i when it writes at next round.
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Classifier(V, k, r) for pi:
V : input value set k: threshold value r: round number
/* Each process i ∈ [n] keeps track of the following variables */
Array LBri . LBri [j] denotes the label of process j sent along its values at round r
Map Si. Si[k] denotes a safe value set for group k
Map ACV ri . ACV ri [k] denotes the set of values accepted with label k, initially ACV ri [k] := ∅
Map RV ri . RV ri [j] denote the values process i read from process j at round r.
Map RT ri . RT ri [j] denote the values process j read from process i at round r.
/* write step*/
1: if isSlave(k, r) then pf := RV r−1i else pf := ∅
2: BRB_broadcast(”write”, pf, v, k, r), wait for wack(−, r) from n− f different processes
/* read step*/
3: BRB_broadcast(“read”,−,−, k, r), wait for n− f rack(Rj , r) s.t. Rj ⊆ ACV ri [k] from pj
4: Set RV ri [j] := Rj if Rj ⊆ ACV ri [k], otherwise RV ri [j] := ∅
/* Classification */
5: Let T: =
n⋃
j=1
RV ri [j]
6: if |T | > k /* height is greater than its label */
/* write-read step */
7: Send master(T, k, r) to all, wait for n− f mack(Rj , r) from pj s.t. Rj ⊆ ACV ri [k]
8: Define T ′ := ∪{Rj | Rj ⊆ ACV ri [k], j ∈ [n]}
9: return (T ′, master)
10: else
11: return (V , slave)
Upon BRB_Deliver(j, type,−, v, k, r)
if type = “write”
Si[m(k, r)] := Si[m(k, r)] ∪ v /* Construct safe value set for group m(k, r) */
ACV ri [k] := ACV ri [k] ∪ v
LBri [j] := k /* Record the label of a process at round r */
Send wack(−, r) to pj
elif type = “read”
RT ri [j] := ACV ri [k]
Send rack(ACV ri [k], r) to pj
endif
Upon receiving master(T, k, r) from pj
wait until T ⊆ ACV ri [k]
Send mack(ACV ri [k], r) to pj
Figure 4 The Byzantine Classifier Procedure
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Line 5-11 is the classification step. Process i is classified as a master process if the size of
the union of valid values obtained in the read step is greater than its label k, otherwise, it is
classified as a slave process. If it is classified as a slave process, it returns its input value
set. If it is classified as a master process, process i performs a write-read step by sending a
master message which includes the set of values it uses to do classification to all and wait for
n− f valid mack message back at line 7. Similar to line 3, a mack message is valid if each
value contained in it has been reliably delivered with correct label. When a process receives
a master message with value set T and label k at round r, it first waits until all values in
T are reliably delivered. Then it sends back a mack message along with the set of values
reliably delivered with label k at round r. The waiting is used to ensure that each value in T
is valid, i.e., be reliably delivered, because a Byzantine process can send arbitrary values
in its master message at line 7. By a similar reasoning as line 3, process i will eventually
obtain valid mack message from at least n− f different processes. After the write-read step,
at line 8, process i updates its value set to be the union of values obtained at line 7.
function V alid(j, type, pf, v, k, r) for process i:
if (type = “write” ∧ ¬isSlave(j, k, r) ∧ v ⊆ Si[k])
∨ (type = “write” ∧ isSlave(j, k, r) ∧ BRB_deliver(j, “write”,−, v, LBr−1i [j], r − 1)
∧ pf [i] = RT r−1i [j] ∧ |
n⋃
j=1
pf [j]| ≤ LBr−1i [j])
∨ (type = “read” ∧ BRB_deliver(j, “write”,−,−, k, r))
return True
else
return False
endif
function isSlave(j, k, r) for process i:
if k = LBr−1i [j]− f2r
return True
else
return False
Figure 5 The Valid Function
The valid function is defined in Fig. 5. In the this function, we first consider the “write”
messages. If the message has been sent by a process that claims to be a master, then it is
considered valid if the value v in this message is contained in the safe value set Si[k]. If
the message has been sent by a process that claims to be a slave, then process i checks (1)
whether process i has BRB_delivered the “write” message containing the same value at
the previous round, (2) whether the ith entry in pf array matches the value process j read
from i in the previous round, and (3) whether the the number of values contained in the
proof pf is at most k. The condition (1) ensures that a slave process sends the same value as
the previous round since a correct slave process must keep its value same as in the previous
round. The condition (2) ensures that the proof sent by the slave process uses values that it
read at round r − 1. The condition (3) checks that the sender classified itself correctly.
If the message is a “read” with label k at round r, process i considers it as valid if it
BRB_deliverd a “write” message with label k at round r from the sender. This is used
to make sure that the sender (possibly Byzantine) must complete its write step in line 1-2
before trying to read at line 3-4.
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The isSlave function invoked in the valid function simply checks whether the label of
the sender matches the label update rule by comparing it with the label at previous round.
3.3 Proof of Correctness
We first define the notion of committing a message.
I Definition 5. We say a process commits a message if it reliably broadcasts the message
and the message is reliably delivered. We say a process commits a message at time t if this
message is reliably delivered by the first process at time t.
By properties of reliable broadcast, we observe that each process (possibly Byzantine)
can commit at most one “write” message and at most one “read” message at each round.
Table 1 Notations
Variable Definition
G A group of processes at round r with label k
slave(G) The slave subgroup of G, i.e., the processes with label s(k, r) at round r + 1
master(G) The master subgroup of G, i.e., the processes with label m(k, r) at round r + 1
V ri The value set of process i at the beginning of round r
Sri
The safe value map of process i at the beginning of round r
Sri [k] is the safe value set of process i for group k at the beginning of round r
Urk The set of admissible values for group k at round r
Define s(k, r) = k − f2r+1 and m(k, r) = k + f2r+1 . The variables we use in the proof are
shown in Table. 1. Consider the classification step in group k at round r. The following
lemma shows that if a Byzantine process wants to commit a “write” message m at round
r + 1 with a slave label, then it must commit a “write” message m′ which contains the same
value as m and a “read” message at round r with label k. Also, it must commit its “read”
message before its “write” message at round r with label k.
I Lemma 6. Suppose that process i (possibly Byzantine) commits a write message
(i, “write”,−, Vi, s(k, r), r + 1). Then
1) The message (i, “read”,−,−, k, r) and the message (i, “write”,−, Vi, k, r) must be com-
mitted by process i.
2) Let t denote the time that message (i, “read”,−,−, k, r) is committed. Then, the message
(i, “write”,−, Vi, k, r) must have been reliably delivered by at least bn+f2 c + 1 − f correct
processes before time t.
Proof. For correct process i, the claim is obvious.
Suppose i is Byzantine. For it to commit a message with label s(k, r) at round r + 1, its
broadcast message has to be echoed by at least bn+f2 c+ 1 different processes. Thus, it has
to prove the values it read at round r to at least bn+f2 c+ 1− f different correct processes,
which implies that it must commit (i, “read”,−,−, k, r). For its read message to be reliably
delivered, by the condition to echo a read message, we know that process i’s write message
with label k and value Vi at round r must be reliably delivered by at least bn+f2 c+ 1− f
correct processes.
J
The above lemma guarantees that if a Byzantine process wants to introduce some values
in the admissible values of a slave group of group k, then it must first complete its write step
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and then complete its read step. Enforcing this order guarantees that the last slave process
(possibly Byzantine) which completes its write step at line 2 must be able to read all values
committed by slave processes in its read step at line 3. This set of values are exactly the
set of admissible values for the slave group, since a slave process can only commit a “write”
message which contains the same value as its “write” message at previous round by the valid
function. Then, since this last slave process is a valid slave process, which is verified in the
valid function, we have that the union of all admissible values for the slave group has size at
most k.
The following lemma shows that the classifier guarantees the properties we defined.
I Lemma 7. Let G be a group at round r with label k. Let L and R be two nonnegative
integers such that L < k ≤ R. If L < |V ri | ≤ R for each correct process i ∈ G, and |Urk | ≤ R,
then
(p1) For each correct process i ∈ master(G), k < |V r+1i | ≤ R
(p2) For each correct process i ∈ slave(G), L < |V r+1i | ≤ k
(p3) Ur+1s(k,r) ⊆ Urk
(p4) Ur+1m(k,r) ⊆ Urk
(p5) |Ur+1m(k,r)| ≤ R
(p6) |Ur+1s(k,r)| ≤ k
(p7) For each correct process j ∈ master(G), Ur+1s(k,r) ⊆ V r+1j
(p8) Each correct process i ∈ slave(G) can commits its value set at round r + 1, i.e.,
V r+1i ⊆ Ur+1s(k,r)
(p9) Each correct process j ∈ master(G) can commit its value set at round r + 1, i.e.,
V r+1j ⊆ Ur+1m(k,r)
(p10) | ∪ {V r+1i | i ∈ slave(G) ∩ C}| ≤ k
(p11) | ∪ {V r+1i | i ∈ master(G) ∩ C}| ≤ R
Proof. (p1)-(p2) : Immediate from the classifier procedure.
(p3): A slave process can only commit the write message that it has reliably broadcast
at previous round. Thus, Ur+1s(k,r) ⊆ Urk .
(p4): The safe value set of each correct process for group m(k, r) is the union of values
reliably broadcast by processes in group k at round r. Thus, Ur+1m(k,r) ⊆ Urk .
(p5): Immediate from (p4)
(p6): Consider group s(k, r) at round r + 1. From Lemma ??, we know that this
group must be the slave group of group k at round r. Let P denote the set of processes
who commit a write message at round r + 1 with label s(k, r). For each process i ∈
P , let (i, “write”, pfi, Vi, s(k, r), r + 1) denote the message that is committed by process
i. Then, Ur+1s(k,r) = ∪{Vi | i ∈ P}. From part 2) of Lemma 6, we have that for each
process i ∈ P the message (i, “write”,−, Vi, k, r) must have been reliably delivered by at
least bn+f2 c + 1 − f correct processes. Let process l ∈ P be the last process such that
its write message (l, “write”,−, Vl, k, r) is reliably delivered by at least bn+f2 c + 1 − f
different correct processes. Let Ql denote the set of correct processes which echoed message
(l, “write”, pfl, Vl, s(k, r), r + 1). We have |Ql| ≥ bn+f2 c+ 1− f . By the condition of echoing
a “write” message, we have pfl[q] = RT rq [l] for each q ∈ Ql.
Consider an arbitrary process p ∈ P . Let Qp denote the set of the first bn+f2 c+1−f correct
processes which reliably delivered message (p, “write”,−, Vp, k, r). Since 2(bn+f2 c+ 1− f) >
n−f , there exists a correct process s ∈ Ql∩Qp. Let t0 denote the time that process s sets its
RT rs [l] as ACV rs [k]. This happens after (l, “read”,−,−, k, r) is reliably delivered by process
t. From part 2) Lemma of 6, the message (l, “write”,−, Vl, k, r) must be reliably delivered by
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at least bn+f2 c+ 1− f correct processes before time t0. Since l is the last process in P such
that its write message (l, “write”,−, Vl, k, r) is reliably delivered by at least bn+f2 c+ 1− f
different correct processes, process p’s write message (p, “write”,−, Vp, k, r) must be reliably
delivered by each process in Qp before time t0. Hence, when process s sets RT rs [l] as ACV rs [k],
the value set Vp has been added into ACV rs [k] by process s. Thus, Vp ⊆ RT rs [l]. Since p
is an arbitrary process in P , we have that for each process p ∈ P , there exists a process
s ∈ Ql such that Vp ⊆ RT rs [l]. Hence, ∪{Vp | p ∈ P} ⊆ ∪{RT rq [l] | q ∈ Q} ⊆
n⋃
j=1
pfl[j]. Since
|
n⋃
j=1
pfl[j]| ≤ k, we have |Ur+1s(k,r)| = | ∪ {Vp | p ∈ P}| ≤ k.
(p7): Consider group s(k, r) at round r + 1. Let P denote the set of processes who
commit a “write” message at round r + 1 with label s(k, r). For each process i ∈ P , let
(i, “write”, pfi, Vi, s(k, r), r + 1) denote the message that is commitd by process i. Then,
Ur+1s(k,r) = ∪{Vi | i ∈ P}. We show that for each i ∈ P , Vi ⊆ V r+1j . From Lemma 6,
we have the message (i, “write”,−, Vi, k, r) must have been reliably delivered by at least
bn+f2 c+ 1− f correct processes. Let P denote the set of correct processes which echoed for
message (i, “write”, pfi, Vi, s(k, r), r + 1). We have |P | ≥ bn+f2 c+ 1− f . Then, process i’s
“read” message (i, “read”,−,−, k, r) and write message (i, “write”,−, Vi, k, r)must be reliably
delivered by each process in P . Also, by the echoing condition, we have pfi[p] = ACV rp [i] for
each p ∈ P and |
n⋃
j=1
pfi[j]| ≤ k. Thus Vi ⊆ ACV rp [k] for each p ∈ P .
Let Q denote the set of correct processes which delivered the message master(T rj , k, r) sent
by correct process j ∈ master(G) at line 7 of round r and we have |Q| ≥ n − 2f . Since
bn+f2 c+1− f +n− 2f > n− f , there exists a correct process s ∈ P ∩Q such that it reliably
delivers (i, “write”,−, Vi, k, r) of process i and message master(T rj , k, r) from process j. We
show that process s must deliver (i, “write”,−, Vi, k, r) before master(T rj , k, r). Suppose that
process t delivers master(T rj , k, r) before (i, “write”,−, Vi, k, r) for contradiction. Then, we
have T rj ⊆ ACV rt [k] when process t delivers (i, “write”,−, Vi, k, r). We also have that process
t must reliable deliver (i, “read”,−,−, k, r) after (i, “write”,−, Vi, k, r). Thus, T rj ⊆ ACV rt [k]
when s delivers (i, “read”,−,−, k, r). Since ACV rs [k] = pfi[s], we have T rj ⊆ pfi[s]. Since
process j is correct and j ∈ master(G), then |T rj | > k. Thus, |
n⋃
j=1
pfi[j]| > k, contradiction.
Therefore, process t delivers master(T rj , k, r) before (i, “write”,−, Vi, k, r). Then, when j
receives mack(Rt, r) from t, we must have Vi ⊆ Rt. Thus, Vi ⊆ V r+1j .
(p8): Since process i is correct, at round r, it must read from at least n − 2f correct
processes. Let Q denote this set of correct processes. Then, at round r + 1, each process in
Q will echo the reliable broadcast message of process i. Thus, there will be at least n− 2f
echo messages. Since f < n5 , we have n− 2f ≥ bn+f2 c+ 1. Hence, eventually the message of
i will be reliable delivered.
(p9): Consider round r, from line 8, we know that V r+1j ⊆ ACV rj [k]. From the property
of reliable broadcast, any value v ∈ V r+1j is reliably broadcast by some process and will
eventually be reliably delivered by each correct process. Hence, value v will be included into
the safe value set of each correct process for the group with label m(k, r). Thus, at round
r + 1, V r+1j will be eventually reliable delivered by each correct process.
(p10): Implied by (p8) and (p6).
(p11): Implied by (p9) and (p5). J
The following lemma shows that the value set of a correct process is non-decreasing.
I Lemma 8. For any correct process i and round r, V ri ⊆ V r+1j .
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Proof. A slave process keeps its value set unchanged and a master process updates its value
set to be the set of reliably delivered values which contains its own value set. J
The following lemma is used later to show that processes in the same group at the end of
the algorithm must have the same set of values. A similar lemma is given in [20, 19]. We
defer its detailed proof in Appendix A.
I Lemma 9. Let G be a group of processes at round r with label k. Then
(1) for each correct process i ∈ G, k − f2r ≤ |V ri | ≤ k + f2r
(2) |Urk | ≤ k + f2r
Proof. By induction on round number r and apply (p1), (p2), (p5) and p(6) of Lemma 7. J
I Lemma 10. Let i and j be two correct processes that are within the same group G with
label k at the beginning of round log f + 1. Then V log f+1i and V
log f+1
j are equal.
Proof. Let G′ be the parent of G with label k′. Assume without loss of generality that
G = M(G′). The proof for the case G = S(G′) follows in the same manner. Since G′ is a
group at round log f , by Lemma 9, we have:
(1) for each correct process p ∈ G′, k′ − 1 < |V log fp | ≤ k′ + 1, and
(2) |U log fk′ | ≤ k′ + 1
Since i ∈ G′ and j ∈ G′, (1) and (2) hold for both process i and j. By the assumption
that G =M(G′), process i and j execute the Classifier procedure with label k′ and are both
classified as master. Let L = k′ − 1 and R = k′ + 1, then by applying Lemma 7(p1) we have
k′ < |V log f+1i | ≤ k′ + 1 and k′ < |V log f+1j | ≤ k′ + 1, thus |V log f+1i | = |V log f+1j | = k′ + 1.
By (p11) of Lemma 7, we have | ∪ {V log f+1i , V log f+1j }| ≤ k′ + 1. Thus, V log f+1i = V log f+1j .
Therefore, V ri and V rj are equal at the beginning of round log f + 1. J
I Lemma 11. (Comparability) For any two correct process i and j, yi and yj are comparable.
Proof. If process i and j are in the same group at the beginning of round log f + 1, then by
Lemma 10, yi = yj . Otherwise, let G be the last group that both i and j belong to. Suppose
G is a group with label k at round r. Suppose i ∈ slave(G) and j ∈ master(G) without loss
of generality. Then, V log f+1i ⊆ Ur+1s(k,r) ⊆ V r+1j ⊆ V log f+1j , by (p8), (p6) (p7) and (p5) of
Lemma 7 and Lemma 8. J
I Theorem 1. There is an O(log f) rounds algorithm for the BLA problem in asynchronous
systems which can tolerate f < n5 Byzantine failures, where n is the number of processes in
the system. The algorithm takes O(n2 log f) messages.
Proof. Downward-Validity. After the initial round, xi ∈ V 1i . By Lemma 8, we have
V 1i ⊆ V log f+1i . Thus xi ∈ V log f+1i . Since yi = unionsq{v ∈ V log f+1i }, we have xi ≤ yi.
Comparability follows from Lemma 11.
Upward-Validity. In the initial round, reliable broadcast is used to construct the safe
value set for the initial group with label k0. By property of reliable broadcast, each Byzantine
process can introduce at most one value into the safe value set for group k0. After the
initial round, all admissible values for each group must be subset of the values reliably
delivered at the initial round. Thus, the union of all value sets held by correct processes
must subset of the union of {xi | i ∈ C} and a set B ⊂ X such that |B| ≤ f . Therefore,
unionsq{yi | i ∈ C} ≤ unionsq({xi | i ∈ C} ∪B), where B ⊂ X and |B| ≤ t. J
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I Remark 12. The reliable broadcast primitive we use can be replaced by a more efficient
one proposed by Imbs et al [12], which can only tolerate f < n5 Byzantine failures but takes
2 asynchronous communication rounds. This suffices for our application.
4 O(log f) Rounds Algorithm for Authenticated BLA Problem
In this section, we present an O(log f) rounds algorithm for the BLA problem in authenticated
(i.e., assuming digital signatures and public-key infrastructure) setting that can tolerate
f < n3 Byzantine failures by modifying the Byzantine tolerant classifier procedure in previous
section. The Byzantine classifier procedure in authenticated setting is shown in Fig. 6. The
primary difference lies in what a process does when it reliably delivers some message and the
validity condition for echoing a broadcast message. The basic idea is to let a process sign
the ack message that it needs to send. Each process uses the set of signed ack messages as
proof of its completion of a write step or read step. In this section, we use 〈x〉i to denote
a message x signed by process i, i.e., 〈x〉i = 〈x, σ〉, where σ is the signature produced by
process i using its private signing key. We say a message is correctly signed by process i if
the signature within the message is a correct signature produced by process i.
4.1 The Authenticated Byzantine Tolerant Classifier
The classifier in the authenticated setting is shown in Fig. 6. The primary difference between
the classifier in previous section and the authenticated classifier is that in the authenticated
classifier each process uses signed messages as proof of its group identity.
At lines 1-2, each process writes its current value set by using the BRB_broadcast
procedure to send a “write” message. If the process is a slave process, it also includes the set
of at least n− f signed rack messages it received at the previous round as a proof that it is
indeed classified as a slave. At line 2, each process waits for correctly signed wack message
from at least n− f different processes. This set of signed wack message is used as the proof
of its completion of the write step when this process tries to read from other processes. When
a process BRB_delivers a “write” message, it performs similar steps as the algorithm in
previous section except that it sends a signed wack message back.
At line 4-5, each process reads from at least n− f processes. Different from the classi-
fier procedure in previous section, each process directly sends a read message along with
the set of correctly signed wack messages obtained at line 2 to all (instead of using the
BRB_broadcast procedure). When a process receives a “read” message with label k for
round r, if uses the validSignature function to check whether the “read” message contains
correctly signed wack message for round r from at least n− f different processes. If so, it
sends back to the sender a signed rack message along with the reliably delivered values with
label k at round r. This ensures that if a process (possibly Byzantine) tries to read from
correct processes, it must complete its write step first.
The classification step from line 6-12 is the same as the classification step of the algorithm
in previous section. A mater process performs a write-read step by sending a master message
along the set of value obtained at line 6. Then it waits for n− f valid mack messages and
updates its value set to be the set of values contained in these messages. When a process
receives a master message, it performs the same steps as in the classifier in previous section.
The valid function is different from the one given in previous section. First, only “write”
messages are reliably broadcast. Second, the proof is a set of signed rack messages instead of
an array in previous section. To verify the proof, the valid function invokes the validSignature
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Classifier(V, k, r):
V : input value set k: threshold value r: round number
Each process i ∈ [n] keeps track of the same variables as the classifier in Fig. 7
Set RV ri , which stores the set of signed rack message in the read step of previous round
/* write step */
1: if isSlave(k, r) then pf := RV r−1i else pf := ∅
2: BRB_broadcast(“write”, pf, v, k, r), wait for n− f valid 〈wack(−, r)〉j from pj
3: Let W denote the set of 〈wack〉j delivered at line 2
/* read step */
4: Send read(W,k, r) to all, wait for n− f valid 〈rack(Rj , r)〉j s.t. Rj ⊆ ACV ri [k] from pj
5: Set RV ri := {〈rack(Rj , r)〉j | Rj ⊆ ACV ri [k]}
/* Classification */
6: Let T := ∪{Rj | Rj ⊆ ACV ri [k]}
/* write-read step */
7: if |T | > k /* height of T is greater than its label */
8: Send master(T, k, r) to all, wait for n− f mack(Rj , r) s.t. Rj ⊆ ACV ri [k] from pj
9: Define T ′ := ∪{Rj | Rj ⊆ ACV ri [k]}
10: return (T ′, master)
11: else
12: return (V , slave)
Upon BRB_deliver(j, t, v, k, r)
if t = “write”
Si[m(k, r)] := Si[m(k, r)] ∪ v
ACV ri [k] := ACV ri [k] ∪ v
Send 〈wack(ACV ri [k], r)〉i to pj
endif
Upon receiving read(W,k, r) from pj
if validSignature(“read”, j,W, r)
Send 〈rack(ACV ri [k], r)〉i to pj
endif
Upon receiving master(T, k, r) from pj
wait until T ⊆ ACV ri [k]
Send mack(ACV ri [k], r) to pj
Figure 6 The Authenticated Byzantine Tolerant Classifier
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function to check whether the proof contains correctly signed rack message for previous
round from at least n− f different processes.
function V alid(j, type, pf, v, k, r):
if (type = “write” ∧ ¬isSlave(j, k, r) ∧ v ⊆ Si[k])
∨ (type = “write”∧ isSlave(j, k, r)∧BRB_deliver(j, “write”,−, v, LBr−1i [j], r− 1)
∧validSignature(“write”, pf, r) ∧ pf contains at most k distinct values
return True
else
return False
endif
function validSignature(type, pf, r):
if (type = “write” ∧ pf contains correctly signed rack(−, r − 1) from n− f processes)
∨ (type = “read” ∧ pf contains correctly signed wack(−, r) from n− f processes)
return True
else
return False
endif
Figure 7 The Valid Function
For the proof of correctness, we just need to prove the classifier procedure satisfies the
properties given Lemma 7 under the assumption that f < n3 . The proof of (p6) and (p7) is
similar to the proof in previous section. Thus, we do not give the formal mathematical proof.
I Lemma 13. Properties (p1)− (p11) of Lemma 7 hold for the classifier shown in Fig. 6.
Proof. (p1)-(p5) : similar to the proofs given in Lemma 7.
(p6): Consider group s(k, r) at round r + 1. Let Q denote the set of processes who
commit their “write” message with label s(k, r) at round r + 1. For process i (possibly
Byzantine) to commit this message, this message has to be echoed by at least bn+f2 c + 1
different processes. By the condition of echo, process i must have received correctly signed
rack(−, r) message from at least n− f processes at line 4 of round r, among which there are
at least n−2f correct processes. When a process tries to read at round r, it has to prove that
it has received at least n−f correctly signed wack(−, r) messages. Thus, process i must have
committed a write message and this message has been reliably delivered by at least n− 2f
correct processes. Let process l ∈ Q be the last process in Q such that its write message is
reliably delivered by at least n− 2f different correct processes. When process l read from at
least n− 2f different correct processes at round r, each process in Q must have written its
value in at least n − 2f different correct processes. Then, since 2(n − 2f) > n − f by the
assumption of f < n3 , process l must have read all values reliably broadcast by processes in
Q. These values are exactly the set Ur+1s(k,r). Since l is a slave process and the size of RV rl
must be at most k, we have |Ur+1s(k,r)| ≤ k.
(p7): Consider group s(k, r) at round r + 1. For a process i ∈ slave(G) to commit its
value set at round r + 1, process i must reliably broadcast the same value set as round r
and must be able to verify the value set RV ri it reads at round r. By a similar argument
as the proof for (p6), process i’s value set must be reliably delivered by at least n − 2f
correct processes at round r before its reading step. Let P denote the set of correct processes
which delivered process i’s value before its reading step at round r and |P | ≥ n− 2f . Let
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Q denote the set of correct processes which delivered the master message sent by process
j ∈ master(G) at line 11 of round r and |Q| ≥ n− 2f . Then, since 2(n− 2f) > n− f by the
assumption of f < n3 , there exists a correct process k ∈ P ∩Q such that it delivered both V ri
and T rj at round r. Since process i is a slave process, process k must send rack to process i
before sending mack to process j, otherwise, process i would be classified as master. Then,
process j must receive V rj from process k and include into V r+1j . Thus, Ur+1s(k,r) ⊆ V r+1j .
(p8): Since process i is correct, at round r, it must have received at least n− f correctly
signed rack message. Then, at round r + 1, it can prove to at least bn+f2 c + 1 correct
processes. Hence, the write message of i at round r + 1 will be reliably delivered by each
correct process.
(p9): Consider round r, from line 8, we know that V r+1j ⊆ ACV rj [k]. From the property
of reliable broadcast, any value v ∈ V r+1j is reliably broadcast by some process with label k
at round r and will eventually be reliably delivered by each correct process. Hence, value v
will be included into the safe value set of each correct process for the group m(k, r). Then,
eventually V r+1j ⊆ Si[m(k, r)] for each correct process i. Thus, when process j ∈ master(G)
tries to reliable broadcast V r+1j at round r + 1, the echo condition eventually holds for each
correct process i. J
I Theorem 2. There is a O(log f) rounds algorithm for the BLA problem in authenticated
asynchronous systems which can tolerate f < n3 Byzantine failures, where n is the number of
processes in the system. The algorithm takes O(n2 log f) messages.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present an O(log f) rounds algorithm for the Byzantine lattice agreement
problem in asynchronous systems which can tolerates f < n5 Byzantine failures. We also
give an O(log f) rounds algorithm for the authenticated setting that can tolerate f < n3
Byzantine failures. One open problem left is to design an algorithm which has resilience of
f < n3 and takes O(log f) rounds.
References
1 Hagit Attiya, Maurice Herlihy, and Ophir Rachman. Atomic snapshots using lattice agreement.
Distributed Computing, 8(3):121–132, 1995.
2 Martin Biely, Zarko Milosevic, Nuno Santos, and Andre Schiper. S-paxos: Offloading the
leader for high throughput state machine replication. In 2012 IEEE 31st Symposium on
Reliable Distributed Systems, pages 111–120. IEEE, 2012.
3 Gabriel Bracha. Asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocols. Information and Computation,
75(2):130–143, 1987.
4 Soma Chaudhuri. More choices allow more faults: Set consensus problems in totally asyn-
chronous systems. Inf. Comput., 105(1):132–158, 1993.
5 Soma Chaudhuri, Maurice Erlihy, Nancy A Lynch, and Mark R Tuttle. Tight bounds for k-set
agreement. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 47(5):912–943, 2000.
6 Giuseppe Antonio Di Luna, Emmanuelle Anceaume, Silvia Bonomi, and Leonardo Querzoni.
Synchronous byzantine lattice agreement in O(log f) rounds. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.02670,
2020.
7 Giuseppe Antonio Di Luna, Emmanuelle Anceaume, and Leonardo Querzoni. Byzantine
generalized lattice agreement. arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.05768, 2019.
8 Danny Dolev and H Raymond Strong. Authenticated algorithms for Byzantine agreement.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 12(4):656–666, 1983.
X. Zheng, and V.K. Garg XX:19
9 Jose M Faleiro, Sriram Rajamani, Kaushik Rajan, G Ramalingam, and Kapil Vaswani.
Generalized lattice agreement. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM symposium on Principles of
distributed computing, pages 125–134. ACM, 2012.
10 Michael J Fischer, Nancy A Lynch, and Michael S Paterson. Impossibility of distributed
consensus with one faulty process. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 32(2):374–382, 1985.
11 Maurice Herlihy, Sergio Rajsbaum, and Mark R Tuttle. Unifying synchronous and asynchronous
message-passing models. In Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on
Principles of distributed computing, pages 133–142, 1998.
12 Damien Imbs and Michel Raynal. Trading off t-resilience for efficiency in asynchronous
byzantine reliable broadcast. Parallel Processing Letters, 26(04):1650017, 2016.
13 Marios Mavronicolasa. A bound on the rounds to reach lattice agreement.
http://www.cs.ucy.ac.cy/ mavronic/pdf/lattice.pdf, 2018.
14 Thomas Nowak and Joel Rybicki. Byzantine approximate agreement on graphs. In 33rd
International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2019). Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-
Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2019.
15 Marshall Pease, Robert Shostak, and Leslie Lamport. Reaching agreement in the presence of
faults. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 27(2):228–234, 1980.
16 Marc Shapiro, Nuno Preguiça, Carlos Baquero, and Marek Zawirski. Conflict-free replicated
data types. In Symposium on Self-Stabilizing Systems, pages 386–400. Springer, 2011.
17 Jan Skrzypczak, Florian Schintke, and Thorsten Schütt. Linearizable state machine replication
of state-based crdts without logs. arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.08733, 2019.
18 Xiong Zheng and Vijay Garg. Byzantine lattice agreement in synchronous systems. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1910.14141, 2019.
19 Xiong Zheng, Vijay K Garg, and John Kaippallimalil. Linearizable replicated state machines
with lattice agreement. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.05871, 2018.
20 Xiong Zheng, Changyong Hu, and Vijay K Garg. Lattice agreement in message passing
systems. In 32nd International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2018). Schloss
Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2018.
A Proof of Lemma 9
I Lemma 9. Let G be a group of processes at round r with label k. Then
(1) for each correct process i ∈ G, k − f2r ≤ |V ri | ≤ k + f2r
(2) |Urk | ≤ k + f2r
Proof. By induction on r. Consider the base case with r = 1, k = k0 = n − f2 . After the
initial round, each process must receive at least n− f different values and at most n values
by the property of reliable broadcast. Thus, k0 − f2 = n − f ≤ |V 1i | ≤ n. Any value in
Urk = U1k0 must be reliably delivered by at least one correct process at the initial round.
Thus, |U1k0 | ≤ k0 + f2 = n.
For the induction step, assume the above lemma holds for all groups at round r − 1.
Consider an arbitrary group G at round r > 1 with label k. Let G′ be the parent group of G
at round r − 1 with label k′. Consider the Classifier procedure executed by all processes in
G′ with label k′. By induction hypothesis, we have:
(1) for each correct process i ∈ G′, k′ − f2r−1 < |V r−1i | ≤ k′ + f2r−1
(2) |Ur−1k′ | ≤ k′ + f2r−1 .
Let L = k′ − f2r−1 and R = k′ + f2r−1 , then (1) and (2) are exactly the conditions of
Lemma 7. Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: G =M(G′). Then k = k′ + f2r . From (p1) and (p5) of Lemma 7, we have:
(1) for each correct process i ∈ G, k − f2r < |V ri | ≤ k + f2r
(2) |Urk | ≤ k + f2r .
XX:20 Byzantine Lattice Agreement in Asynchronous Systems
Case 2: G = S(G′). Then k = k′ − f2r . Similarly, from (p2) and (p6) of Lemma 7, we
have the same equations. J
